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The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: 
Strengthening It or Killing It? 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.∗ 
“This Civil Rights Act is a challenge to all of us to go to work in 
our communities and our States, in our homes and in our hearts, to 
eliminate the last vestiges of injustice in our beloved country.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
As President Lyndon Johnson noted 50 years ago, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was passed to help eliminate injustice and ensure 
that all would have a reasonably equal opportunity to enjoy the 
riches of American society.2 More specifically, Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act (Title VII) focuses on providing equal opportunity 
in the workplace, which allows individuals to rise or fall based on 
their talent. However, what equal opportunity has meant in the past 
and what equal opportunity will mean in the future is contested. 
Though the meaning of the basic provisions of a statute that has 
been law for 50 years should be settled, Title VII’s meaning is not 
settled. Indeed, over the past few years, the Supreme Court has 
destabilized the meaning of Title VII by rethinking doctrines that 
many thought established.3 How the Supreme Court will shape Title 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Richmond. 
 1. This quote is from President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s statement 
accompanying the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill (July 
2, 1964) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives 
.hom/speeches.hom/640702.asp [http://perma.cc/TZN5-UZS7] (archived Apr. 2, 
2014)). 
 2. Some have suggested employment discrimination law to be a project of 
near Biblical proportions. See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment 
Discrimination Law: Does The Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the 
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 685 (2010) (“From the beginning, it was 
an astoundingly ambitious, and perhaps audacious, project. Congress envisioned a 
tower of law that would elevate people, reaching toward the heavens by 
attempting to eradicate invidious employment discrimination.”). 
 3. See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court 
Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 577–79 (2010); 
see also Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has begun to shed some of its interpretive 
principles in employment discrimination cases as it has abandoned its preference 
for deeming similar language in employment discrimination statutes to have the 
same meaning). 
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VII doctrine and what that will mean for equal opportunity in the 
workplace is unclear. 
Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating with 
respect to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment or compensation because of the employee’s race, color, 
sex, religion, or national origin.4 In addition, employers are barred 
from discriminating against individuals because they have formally 
or informally challenged practices that they believe violate Title 
VII.5 Those simple prohibitions have been the subject of discussion 
and analysis for 50 years. At times, the Supreme Court has boldly 
pushed the limits of Title VII in favor of equality. For example, its 
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. confirmed Title VII’s 
expansive reach by noting the existence of a disparate impact cause 
of action under Title VII.6 Conversely, at times, the Supreme 
Court’s support for Title VII’s basic goals has been suspect. During 
the late 1980s, the Court’s narrow interpretation of Title VII helped 
lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.7 The 1991 Act 
installed a number of features into the employment discrimination 
landscape that significantly altered Title VII, including jury trials 
and punitive damages.8 
However, in recent years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes has called 
into question the future arc of Title VII doctrine.9 The Court appears 
ready to redefine nondiscrimination and equality under Title VII. 
Indeed, some of the Court’s rulings suggest that a robust quest for 
full equality in the workplace may not be achievable without 
amendments to Title VII’s current text.10 Rather than broaden Title 
VII protections through doctrinal evolution in the same manner that 
                                                                                                             
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 5. See id. § 2000e-3. 
 6. 401 U.S. 424, 431–33 (1971). Twenty years later, the disparate impact 
cause of action was formalized in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071.  
 7. See Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of 
Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 428 (2012) (noting that the 
1991 Civil Rights Act was passed in response to Supreme Court doctrine). 
 8. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Indeed, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), 
triggered the Lilly Ledbetter Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
That Congress had to amend a statute does not necessarily mean that the case at 
issue was wrongly decided, at least with respect to precedent. See Charles A. 
Sullivan, Raising The Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
499, 501 (2010) (“First, Ledbetter was by no means a radical decision; indeed, it 
was the logical outgrowth of earlier, very restrictive Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting Title VII statute of limitations periods.”). 
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some earlier Courts have, the current Court is chipping away at Title 
VII’s protections.11 Even in areas in which the Court appears willing 
to support a broadened application of Title VII, it has narrowed Title 
VII’s effective reach with procedural and substantive roadblocks 
that make potential claims less promising. This approach may be by 
design or it may be—as the Supreme Court argues in its opinions—
that the Court is merely applying Title VII’s text, with statutory 
amendment being the appropriate solution for any of Title VII’s 
supposed shortcomings.12  
Whether the Court’s chipping away at Title VII is an attempt to 
make Title VII into a 21st century diamond, or an attempt to make it 
a 21st century pile of diamond dust, or merely an attempt to interpret 
Title VII consistent with its text is a matter of opinion. This Article 
explores how the Court is interpreting and reinterpreting Title VII 
and necessarily considers whether the Court’s reinterpretation will 
likely reinvigorate or damage Title VII’s broad goal of workplace 
equality. This Article tentatively considers what may be next for 
Title VII. Part I briefly discusses Title VII’s scope. Part II notes how 
some of the Court’s recent cases affect Title VII doctrine. Part III 
suggests how the Court’s decisions may affect Title VII’s ability to 
facilitate a broad vision of equality in the workplace.  
I. TITLE VII’S SCOPE  
Title VII is supposed to help ensure equality in the workplace by 
removing barriers that have yielded systematic inequality in that 
setting.13 This requires focusing both on the language and structure 
of Title VII so that it can be read consistently with its purpose. The 
Supreme Court has, in the past, attempted to read ambiguous text 
consistent with Title VII’s broader purposes.14 When used properly, 
that interpretive method does not override Title VII’s text. Rather, it 
confirms the text’s meaning when the text is deemed somewhat 
unclear.  
                                                                                                             
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) (“If the effect of 
applying Title VII’s text is that some claims that would be doomed under one 
theory will survive under the other, that is the product of the law Congress has 
written. It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is 
necessary to achieve what we think Congress really intended.”). 
 13. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The 
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and 
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998) (interpreting Title VII to encompass same-sex sexual harassment).  
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Title VII is broad. It applies to employers, employment 
agencies, and labor organizations.15 Employers cannot discriminate 
with respect to an individual’s or employee’s employment because 
of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.16 
Likewise, employment agencies cannot refuse to refer an individual 
for a job because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.17 Lastly, labor organizations cannot restrict access to 
membership in the organization or decline to admit an individual to 
an apprentice or training program because of the individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.18 Title VII suggests that those 
who control work are supposed to provide work on an equal basis 
without respect to certain characteristics that an individual 
possesses. 
Title VII bars discrimination broadly. It bars intentional 
discrimination and retaliation against individuals.19 Title VII bars 
intentional discrimination, and some forms of unintentional 
discrimination, against groups.20 Title VII allows individuals and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to sue under 
Title VII.21 Individuals can sue to address disputes between an 
individual employee and an employer.22 The EEOC can sue on 
behalf of a person or groups of people.23  
Title VII allows broad recovery for discrimination.24 It provides 
monetary relief for past harm, allowing recovery for back pay to 
cover pay and benefits that an employee would have earned had the 
employee not been subject to discrimination,25 as well as 
compensatory and punitive damages in certain circumstances.26 It 
provides relief for future harm, authorizing reinstatement to a 
position or front pay in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is 
                                                                                                             
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 16. Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
 17. Id. § 2000e-2(b). 
 18. Id. § 2000e-2(c). 
 19. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). 
 20. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) 
(discussing intentional discrimination); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977) (discussing unintentional discrimination). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 23. See § 2000e-5(f); e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 24. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar 
Workplace: Toward a Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 447, 449 (2008) (“While the current legal regime typically focuses on 
breaking down barriers to entry or opportunity, Title VII also has a history of 
broad remedial power over discrimination in the workplace.”). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006). 
 26. Id.§ 1981a(a)(1). 
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not feasible.27 It also provides non-monetary relief, permitting 
injunctive relief and declaratory relief,28 as well as affirmative 
action in appropriate cases to address an employer’s structural 
discrimination.29  
Title VII addresses nearly all discrimination-based workplace 
harms.30 It bars discrimination, allows wide recovery for 
discriminatory conduct, and encourages challenges to unlawful 
employment practices by barring retaliation for challenging such 
practices. Title VII covers myriad actors and activities in the 
workplace, aiming at small and large issues. Drawn with a wide 
reach, Title VII has been amended to remain that way. That breadth 
allows for Title VII’s goal—workplace equality—to be met through 
aggressive enforcement.  
Nonetheless, courts can limit Title VII recovery and restrict its 
scope. Some courts have suggested that some discrimination that 
appears to violate Title VII may not be compensable because it is 
too insignificant to be actionable.31 Similarly, though Title VII bars 
retaliation against those who have challenged an unlawful 
employment practice, the Court has indicated that some forms of 
retaliation may not be compensable.32 Courts have the final say on 
Title VII and can limit it as they see fit.33 Unquestionably, the 
Supreme Court has limited Title VII in recent years. 
II. NOTES ON THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT TITLE VII 
JURISPRUDENCE  
In the past several years, the Supreme Court has decided various 
Title VII cases in ways that may affect Title VII’s effectiveness. 
Some of the cases provide employers with additional latitude to 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 2000e-5(g). 
 29. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See generally Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).  
 30. There is a line between workplace behavior that is covered by Title VII 
and workplace behavior that must be tolerated. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (noting that Title VII does not cover all 
workplace harm). 
 31. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, 
Conditions or Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 
(1996); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 
1122 (1998).  
 32. For a discussion of the limitations of Title VII retaliation, see Henry L. 
Chambers, Jr., The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm, 8 FIU L. REV. 
317, 329–31 (2013).  
 33. The Supreme Court is the final interpreter of Title VII. See, e.g., Univ. of 
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).  
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structure the workplace and avoid Title VII liability. Other cases 
narrow Title VII’s effect in substantive areas such as disparate 
impact and retaliation. Others install procedural impediments that 
may limit Title VII recovery. When considered together, the cases 
may significantly restrict Title VII’s reach.  
A. Employer Latitude  
The Court has gradually limited protections for employees under 
Title VII by providing employers increasing latitude to structure the 
workplace in ways that may facilitate discrimination. Title VII was 
designed to restrict the employer’s ability to discriminate but was 
not designed to completely eliminate employer autonomy.34 
However, when employer autonomy intersects with or leads to 
discrimination, Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination ought to 
prevail. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been subtly allowing 
employer prerogative to override employment discrimination 
statutes by allowing employers to structure their actions to avoid 
liability or by removing coverage for decisions that the Court 
believes ought to be within the employer’s discretion. This may 
affect how well Title VII meets its overarching objectives.  
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court addressed 
who could be considered a supervisor for purposes of Title VII 
hostile work environment (HWE) harassment.35 The issue is 
important because a supervisor can trigger HWE liability more 
easily than a non-supervisor.36 The Court defined who is a 
“supervisor” fairly narrowly, limiting supervisory status for HWE 
harassment purposes to workers who can take significant, tangible 
employment actions against other employees.37 Restricting 
supervisory status so narrowly potentially limits recovery for HWE 
harassment. In the process, the Court provided a roadmap for 
employers to restrict the workers who can be deemed supervisors for 
HWE harassment purposes, potentially narrowing liability for such 
harassment even further.  
                                                                                                             
 34. That Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees suggests 
that many small employers ought to retain the autonomy to run their businesses as 
they wish. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 35. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 36. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998). 
 37. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443 (holding that for purposes of hostile work 
environment harassment, a supervisor is an employee who can “effect ‘a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits’”). 
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HWE harassment occurs when an employee is subject to 
harassment that is significant enough to alter the employee’s terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment but causes no tangible job 
detriment.38 When a supervisor is responsible for HWE harassment, 
the employer is liable for the harassment unless it can prove a two-
part affirmative defense.39 The affirmative defense requires that the 
employer prove that it reasonably attempted to address or remedy 
the harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to attempt 
to avoid the harm from the harassment.40 Conversely, when a non-
supervisor is responsible for HWE harassment, the employer is 
liable if it was negligent in allowing the harassment to occur.41 
Employer liability for coworker harassment is more limited than it is 
for supervisor harassment. Consequently, whether a coworker is a 
supervisor or not matters.  
The Vance Court analyzed whether a harasser is a supervisor 
from the employer’s perspective and narrowly construed who is a 
supervisor by focusing on the specific tasks that a supervisor 
performs.42 The Court abandoned common definitions of 
“supervisor,” focusing on defining “supervisor” for the specific 
purpose of determining when the employer should be liable for 
HWE harassment.43 In searching for a definition of “supervisor” that 
could readily distinguish a supervisor from a coworker, the Court 
suggested that such a simple distinction was both necessary and 
possible to make in these circumstances.44 The Court ignored the 
more nuanced definition of “supervisor” that the EEOC had 
developed.45 The Court’s quest yielded a limited definition of 
                                                                                                             
 38. For a general discussion of quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually 
Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 740–43 (2002). 
 39. See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 764–65. 
 40. See id. at 765. 
 41. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 
 42. See id. at 2443. 
 43. Id. at 2444 (“In general usage, the term ‘supervisor’ lacks a sufficiently 
specific meaning to be helpful for present purposes.”).  
 44. Id. at 2443–44 (discussing the need for a simple definition of “supervisor” 
consistent with existing HWE harassment doctrine). 
 45. Id. at 2443 (“Other courts have substantially followed the more open-
ended approach advocated by the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, which ties 
supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily 
work.”). Unfortunately, the Court often does not defer to the EEOC’s judgment on 
employment discrimination matters. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: 
The Supreme Court and The EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (“In 
the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the U.S. Supreme Court often prefers to 
‘chart its own course’ rather than to defer to Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (‘EEOC’ or ‘Commission’) regulations and guidance interpreting 
these laws.”). 
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“supervisor” that focuses on the supervisor/coworker’s ability to 
hire, fire, or take major job actions against the employee.46  
The Vance Court suggested that its position is consistent with 
the structure of sexual harassment liability and the affirmative 
defense.47 Indeed, the Court noted that it ignored colloquial 
definitions of “supervisor” because it was attempting to define the 
word in the context of existing HWE doctrine.48 However, the Court 
has mixed two different concepts. The Court’s desire for a clear 
definition of “supervisor” morphed into the desire for an easy-to-
apply definition of “supervisor” and resulted in a limited definition 
of “supervisor.” The definition the Court adopted may be easier to 
apply but may not be particularly related to the original issue 
underlying the affirmative defense—when an employer should be 
responsible for HWE harassment.49 The affirmative defense to 
HWE liability exists to define when the employer should be 
responsible for the HWE harassment, e.g., when the act of the 
supervisor should be considered the act of the employer or when the 
worker responsible has been aided by his or her position as the 
employer’s agent.50 Limiting who is a supervisor by using an easy-
to-apply definition of “supervisor” may limit liability, but it is not 
clear that such limitation is more consistent with the purpose of the 
affirmative defense than using a somewhat less clear definition.51 
Indeed, focusing on the issue from the employee’s perspective rather 
than the employer’s perspective, as the Court did, may be sensible.  
The Vance Court halfheartedly considered who could be deemed 
a supervisor from the employee’s perspective in recognizing the 
effect that a putative supervisor/coworker could have on the 
employee’s working conditions.52 However, after noting that the 
supervisor/coworker in Vance could exercise effective control over 
Vance’s work atmosphere and make the work atmosphere very 
uncomfortable, the Court noted that a non-supervisory coworker 
                                                                                                             
 46. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
 47. Id. at 2441. 
 48. Id. at 2443 (noting that supervisor status is to be determined in the shadow 
of Ellerth and Faragher, the two cases that created the HWE affirmative defense 
and “presuppose[d] a clear distinction between supervisors and co-workers”).  
 49. Id. at 2446 (“[T]he term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and 
Faragher as a label for the class of employees whose misconduct may give rise to 
vicarious employer liability.”). 
 50. Id. at 2441. 
 51. The Court would clearly disagree, suggesting that the Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), decisions specifically focus on limiting supervisors to 
those with significant power over tangible employment benefits. See Vance, 133 
S. Ct. at 2448. 
 52. Id. 
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could do the same.53 Rather than analyze the issue more deeply, the 
Court refocused the inquiry on whether the supervisor/coworker had 
control over major job decisions. However, how an employee 
experiences the supervisor/coworker’s power in the workplace 
would also seem relevant to whether the supervisor/coworker was 
aided in harassing the employee by the power given to him or her by 
the employer—a key issue according to the Vance Court.54 Whether 
the supervisor/coworker could exercise coercive power over the 
employee would seem to be a reasonable test for whether he or she 
has supervisory power under the relevant circumstances. That is, 
rather than asking whether the putative supervisor in Vance could 
hire and fire, the Court could have asked whether the employee 
could treat the putative supervisor just like another coworker without 
any repercussions related to the employee’s job duties. If so, the 
supervisor/coworker is a coworker; if not, the supervisor/coworker is 
a supervisor for HWE purposes. Unfortunately, the Vance Court did 
not engage these issues in extended fashion. 
Ironically, the HWE affirmative defense could resolve the issue 
simply. The affirmative defense requires that the employer 
reasonably attempt to prevent or stop the harassment and that the 
employee unreasonably fail to prevent or avoid the harassment.55 If 
the employer has a reasonable reporting system, the employee who 
believes he or she is being harassed by a supervisor will presumably 
use the reporting system or lose the case because the affirmative 
defense has been proven. However, by determining that the putative 
supervisor in Vance was a mere coworker, the affirmative defense 
was deemed irrelevant.56 In the process, the Vance Court allowed an 
employer to structure the application of Title VII by providing 
diffuse supervisory authority that may limit the employer’s 
liability.57  
The Court’s willingness to give employers additional latitude is 
a serious issue. When an employer is allowed to exercise too much 
authority in deciding an issue that is fundamental to liability, the 
employer effectively controls Title VII’s scope. Vance is not the 
only recent case in which the Court has allowed increased employer 
latitude. The Court allowed broad employer discretion in Hosanna-
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. (“The ability to direct another employee’s tasks is simply not 
sufficient. Employees with such powers are certainly capable of creating 
intolerable work environments, but so are many other co-workers.”). 
 54. Id. at 2441. 
 55. Id. at 2439. 
 56. Id. at 2453. 
 57. The case is generally pro-employer. See id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.58 Though this case is 
not a Title VII case, it is an employment discrimination case that 
may affect Title VII doctrine.  
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court ruled that employees who are 
considered ministers by the church-related entities that employ them 
cannot sue their employers for employment discrimination.59 The 
Court’s decision flows from its recognition of a ministerial 
exception based on the First Amendment.60 The Establishment and 
Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment combine to allow 
churches to choose their own ministers without interference from 
government.61 Exposing churches to possible liability from 
employment discrimination statutes from church pastors is 
considered interference by the government.62 Though the basis for 
the exception is not particularly controversial, the exception can be 
applied broadly or narrowly.63  
The Hosanna-Tabor Court provided the impetus for a possibly 
too broad interpretation of the ministerial exception. In that case, 
plaintiff Cheryl Perich was fired for threatening to file an Americans 
with Disabilities Act lawsuit against her employer, a Lutheran 
church school.64 Perich had been a called teacher at the school, 
meaning that she had gone through religious training and had been 
called by the congregation to her position.65 Before she was called, 
she had been a lay teacher at the same school.66 During her tenure as 
a called teacher, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and placed 
on medical leave.67 She attempted to return to her position in the 
middle of the school year but was told that she had been replaced for 
the year by a lay teacher.68 Perich persisted in attempting to return to 
her position and was eventually fired when she indicated that she 
planned to sue the school.69 The EEOC sued on Perich’s behalf, 
alleging retaliation by the school.70 Perich eventually joined the suit 
as an intervenor.71 The school moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the ministerial exception shielded its actions from 
                                                                                                             
 58. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 710. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 702. 
 62. See id. at 709–10. 
 63. Id. at 705. 
 64. Id. at 700. 
 65. Id. at 699. 
 66. Id. at 700. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 701. 
 71. Id. 
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review and sanction.72 The school won at the district court but lost at 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.73 The Supreme 
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and found for the school.74 In ruling 
for the church school, the Court rejected the argument that the 
position at issue could be, and was in fact, filled by a lay person and, 
thus, was not subject to the ministerial exception.75 The Court 
focused more on whether the church and school regarded Perich as a 
minister than on what the requirements of her position were.76  
The broad discretion that a religious employer may exercise 
under Hosanna-Tabor is a major concern. The Court suggested that 
the case involved a church firing a minister.77 Such a termination 
would clearly seem to be covered by the ministerial exception. 
However, the case can as easily be construed as involving a church 
school firing a teacher. Certainly, the congregation did vote to 
rescind Perich’s call.78 However, given that Perich’s position had 
been filled by a lay teacher, i.e., Perich, before Perich was called and 
was filled by a lay teacher when Perich became ill, it is not clear that 
Perich had to retain her call to retain the position.79 Perich clearly 
was a minister, and her skills and training as a minister certainly 
allowed her to function better in her role as a teacher at the school.80 
Whether Perich should have been considered a minister or a school 
teacher for purposes of the firing may be a contested question. 
However, giving the issue to the employer to decide effectively ends 
the discussion and does not provide a clear limit for the ministerial 
exception.  
Under Hosanna-Tabor, a church school can fire a minister–
teacher who is doing a job that a lay teacher can do. If a lay teacher 
is considered to be ministering to children at the church school, it is 
not clear that the lay teacher should not be considered a minister for 
purposes of the ministerial exception.81 It is unclear whether 
Hosanna-Tabor limits how a church or church-related entity 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 701–02. 
 74. Id. at 710. 
 75. See id. at 708–09. 
 76. Id. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the 
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment 
discrimination suit against her religious employer.”). 
 77. Id. at 699. 
 78. Id. at 700. 
 79. Perich originally requested reinstatement to her position as a called 
teacher but abandoned that relief. See id. at 709. 
 80. See id. at 707. 
 81. Churches often consider various employees to be ministers. See, e.g., 
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding 
music director to be subject to ministerial exception). 
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determines who is a minister or what positions can be deemed 
ministerial and, therefore, subject to the ministerial exception. If a 
church-related employer can describe nearly all of its employees as 
ministers and the inquiry into the employer’s good faith is limited, 
the employer’s definition of who is a minister will govern in most 
situations.82 It is possible, depending on how Hosanna-Tabor is 
read, that the Court believes that the First Amendment requires that 
religious employers have such latitude. Nonetheless, if a church-
related entity does have such latitude, it has the power to restrict the 
scope of employment discrimination statutes significantly. 
Providing additional employer latitude tends to narrow 
protection for workers. Whether Vance and Hosanna-Tabor will 
yield little or significant additional employer latitude is unclear. 
Other cases may blunt or reinforce employer latitude.83 However, 
providing the possibility that employers may be able to manage their 
way out of Title VII liability limits Title VII’s effectiveness. 
B. Disparate Impact 
The Court’s recent jurisprudence appears to narrow the 
application of disparate impact discrimination. That is troubling 
because disparate impact discrimination is core to Title VII’s 
effectiveness. As suggested by the codification of disparate impact 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress has consistently 
defended and championed the need for recompense for disparate 
impact discrimination.84 Certainly, the Supreme Court recognizes 
that disparate impact cannot be judicially destroyed. However, the 
Court appears ready to continually chip away at disparate impact’s 
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
Disparate impact has been a part of Title VII doctrine since 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. affirmed the existence of a disparate 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that courts should defer to the good faith of religious employers). 
 83. See generally AT&T v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2009) (allowing 
employer to decide whether to continue to use rule that perpetuated the effects of 
past lawful discrimination); Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 
(2008) (noting support for allowing employer prerogative to fire based on 
irrelevant, but not unlawful, grounds). However, the Court restricted employer 
prerogatives in a non-Title VII employment discrimination case ruling that the 
contention that the Court rejected might have allowed an employer to shield itself 
from liability. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011) 
(construing the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
of 1994). 
 84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
2014] THE SUPREME COURT AND TITLE VII 1173 
 
 
 
impact cause of action in 1971.85 The magnitude of the inclusion of 
disparate impact under Title VII cannot be overstated. The inclusion 
meant that Title VII was not limited to barring intentional 
discrimination.86 The disparate impact cause of action allowed 
recovery for an employer’s use of facially neutral rules that had a 
disproportionately negative impact on particular groups of 
employees.87 Employers could defend the use of the relevant rule or 
employment practice on the grounds that business necessity required 
the rule.88 However, the need for an employer to defend itself in a 
situation in which it had arguably not intentionally discriminated 
changed the dynamic of Title VII. Disparate impact liability limits 
the exercise of employer prerogative when use of that prerogative 
harms certain groups of employees.89 More broadly, with the advent 
of disparate impact liability, Title VII bars unintentional 
discrimination that could effectively limit members of certain 
groups from advancing in the workplace.90 Though disparate impact 
necessarily relates to group harm, its focus is not on making sure 
that groups do well under Title VII. Rather, disparate impact focuses 
on employment practices that are unnecessary to the running of an 
employer’s business but harm members of certain groups in greater 
proportion than they harm members of other groups.91 
The reach of disparate impact, and its focus on employment 
practices rather than group harm, became clear in Connecticut v. 
                                                                                                             
 85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The disparate impact claim was not created as much 
as it was recognized by the Court. 
 86. However, some argue that disparate impact is a search for discriminatory 
motivation. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An 
Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987). 
 87. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reviewing the 
application of height and weight rules that excluded women from certain prison 
guard positions). 
 88. The absence of business necessity doomed the use of the rule. See Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”). 
 89. The paring of prerogative was evident when employers were limited to 
giving employment tests that were job related. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing when an employment test is sufficiently 
job related to overcome disparate impact); see also Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2012) (providing guidelines to 
determine job-relatedness of employment tests). 
 90. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 91. See id. at 431–32. For a discussion of disparate impact within a few 
years of its codification by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Ronald Turner, 
Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and 
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 447–49 (1995). 
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Teal.92 In that case, the Court reviewed the defendant–employer’s 
two-step promotion process.93 The first step was a written test that 
created an eligibility list of workers who were qualified for 
promotion; it had a racially disparate impact.94 The second step, 
during which the promotions were made using additional job-related 
factors, reversed the effect of the first step such that the group that 
was eventually promoted was as diverse as the original pool of 
workers who sought promotion and was more diverse than the pool 
of workers on the eligibility list.95 The defendant–employer argued 
that no disparate impact prima facie case could be made and no 
disparate impact claim could succeed if its process as a whole did 
not yield a disproportionate impact, i.e., if those promoted were as 
racially diverse as those in the original pool for promotion.96 The 
Court rejected that “bottom-line” defense, ruling that the use of any 
rule or employment practice that yields a disparate impact and is not 
backed by business necessity is inappropriate without regard to the 
results of the remainder of the process.97 The Teal Court suggested 
that disparate impact focuses on the effect that a particular rule has. 
Presumably, had the first stage not been in place and the remainder 
of the process been kept the same, minorities could have been 
promoted at an even higher rate.98 The Teal Court’s effect on 
disparate impact doctrine was to bar the use of a rule that may limit 
the horizon of minority workers even if the rule is part of a process 
that produces demographically fair results. 
However, the Court has not been a consistent supporter of a 
broad vision of disparate impact liability. The Court was not 
particularly solicitous of the disparate impact cause of action in 
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.99 Wards Cove was a fairly 
complex case that involved seasonal salmon cannery operations.100 
The defendant–employer treated cannery workers and non-cannery 
                                                                                                             
 92. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 93. Id. at 443–44. 
 94. Id. at 443. 
 95. See id. at 444 (noting that the employer chose employees to be promoted 
from the eligibility list by considering “past work performance, recommendations 
of the candidates’ supervisors and, to a lesser extent, seniority”). 
 96. See id. at 441–43. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Of course, that might have triggered a disparate impact claim from 
disgruntled whites. For a discussion of such claims, see Charles A. Sullivan, The 
World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1505 (2004). 
 99. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 100. Id. at 646. 
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workers differently.101 Not only did cannery and non-cannery 
workers work under different conditions, they were hired differently 
and paid different wages.102 The groups also had very different 
racial compositions, with the cannery workers having a much higher 
percentage of native minority workers than the non-cannery 
workers.103 A number of cannery workers sued the employer 
claiming disparate treatment (intentional) and disparate impact 
discrimination.104 The statistical evidence of disparate impact was 
limited to comparing the racial makeup of the cannery workers to 
the racial makeup of the non-cannery workers.105 Of course, that 
comparison was irrelevant when comparing unskilled cannery 
workers to skilled non-cannery workers because the very different 
skills required for the different types of jobs created different pools 
of eligible workers for those jobs, possibly with very different racial 
makeups. However, the Court found the statistical evidence 
insufficient to support a disparate impact prima facie case even 
when unskilled non-cannery workers were compared to unskilled 
cannery workers.106 The Court argued that such a comparison was 
relevant only if the unskilled cannery workers and the unskilled non-
cannery workers were chosen from a similar labor pool, without 
explaining in much detail why the pools for unskilled cannery and 
non-cannery labor would be significantly different.107 The Court 
also noted that the plaintiffs had to explain which specific 
employment practice caused the disparate impact. Plaintiffs could 
not rely on the disparate impact that resulted from an entire 
employment process in which several discrete rules were 
embedded.108 In addition, the Court appeared to relax the business 
necessity standard from Griggs, allowing business necessity to be 
met with a reasonable justification for the rule.109  
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 646–47. See also Saucedo, supra note 24, at 457–59 (discussing 
Wards Cove and suggesting that it was an essentially segregated workplace). 
 102. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 646–47. 
 103. Id. at 647–48. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 650–51; see also Saucedo, supra note 24, at 457 (“Filipino, 
Hispanic, Asian, and Eskimo employees held the unstable, lower-paying, and less 
desirable cannery jobs. Anglos held the stable and more desirable noncannery 
jobs.”). 
 106. See Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 653. 
 107. See id. (noting that the pool of unskilled cannery workers may be different 
than the pool of unskilled non-cannery workers even though the skills for the jobs 
may be “somewhat fungible”). 
 108. Id. at 656–57. 
 109. Id. at 659 (noting that “a mere insubstantial justification . . . will not 
suffice” to meet the business necessity standard, but that the employer rule need 
not “be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business”). 
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Wards Cove was a blow to disparate impact doctrine. Though 
the Court did not question the existence of the disparate impact 
cause of action, it made the cause of action far more difficult to win. 
The proof that the Court appeared to require just to make a prima 
facie case appeared significant; the proof necessary to win would be 
far more substantial. Given how the Court structured the proof in 
Wards Cove, the disparate impact claim appeared to be in serious 
trouble. Congress responded to Wards Cove with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.110  
The 1991 Act redefined the disparate impact cause of action in a 
manner that reversed Wards Cove in significant measure.111 The 
disparate impact cause of action was explicitly codified in the 1991 
Act, with its contours made plain.112 Under the 1991 Act, an 
unlawful employment practice has been proven when the plaintiff 
proves a disparate impact and the employer cannot prove that the 
rule or practice involved is job related or based on a business 
necessity.113 An unlawful employment practice has been similarly 
proven if the plaintiff presented the employer with an alternative 
employment practice with less discriminatory effect than the rule at 
issue and the employer declined to adopt the alternative practice.114 
The plaintiff is also no longer required to identify a specific 
employment practice as the cause of a disparate impact in all 
instances. If a broad employment practice is composed of several 
rules or practices that are difficult to disentangle, the plaintiff may 
analyze the broad practice as a single employment practice for 
disparate impact purposes.115 The 1991 Act made clear that 
disparate impact is an important part of Title VII that would not be 
severely limited based on the proof structures that the Supreme 
Court constructed.116 Congress’s quick response to a problematic 
case suggests that it believed that Title VII remained a primary 
avenue to provide equality in the workplace and Title VII’s effects 
should not be blunted by unnecessary procedural restrictions.  
Almost two decades after Congress reaffirmed the disparate 
impact cause of action’s place in the Title VII firmament through the 
1991 Act, the Supreme Court muddied disparate impact’s role in 
                                                                                                             
 110. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 111. See Saucedo, supra note 24, at 459 (noting that the 1991 Act corrected 
many of Wards Cove’s shortcomings). 
 112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006). 
 113. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 114. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 115. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
 116. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a reaction to Wards 
Cove, see Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-
in Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2011). 
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Ricci v. DeStefano.117 Arguably, the Court implicitly questioned the 
theory of disparate impact discrimination. In Ricci, New Haven 
sought to select captains and lieutenants for its fire department.118 
The City gave a written test that counted for 60% of the score and an 
oral examination that counted for the remaining 40% of the score.119 
The tests had been developed by a firm with experience in 
developing such tests.120 After the scores were calculated and the 
rank-order eligibility list was created, the City had to decide whether 
to certify the list and use the results to choose captains and 
lieutenants.121 If the test results were used, the City’s officer rank 
would not necessarily have become more diverse.122 In addition, 
New Haven recognized that other testing procedures that the City 
had yet to try might yield a diverse group of officers.123 The City 
had also been told that it would be sued by minority firefighters who 
would not be promoted if the list was certified.124 Consequently, the 
City declined to certify the eligibility list.125 
Firefighters who very likely would have been promoted had the 
list been used sued, claiming that the City engaged in intentional 
discrimination against them based on race.126 The City defended the 
claim arguing that it could refuse to certify the eligibility list 
because use of the list would yield a disparate impact.127 The Court 
found that the City’s decision to decline to use the results of the test 
was intentional discrimination128 and further ruled that such 
intentional discrimination could only be justified if the City had “a 
strong basis in evidence” to believe that it would be subject to 
liability had it not intentionally discriminated.129 The Court 
explained that the City did not have a strong basis in evidence 
because the test appeared to be job related, i.e., a reasonable judge of 
merit for the positions at issue.130 The Court then ruled that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment against New Haven.131  
                                                                                                             
 117. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 118. Id. at 562. 
 119. Id. at 564. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 562–63. 
 122. Id. at 566. 
 123. Id. at 570–71. 
 124. Id. at 562. 
 125. Id. at 574. 
 126. Id. at 563. 
 127. Id. at 572–74. 
 128. Id. at 563. 
 129. See id. at 585. 
 130. See id. at 592 (suggesting no reason for New Haven to believe that the 
tests were not job related). 
 131. See id. at 593. 
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The Ricci Court’s position is somewhat inconsistent with the 
long history of disparate impact as an integral part of Title VII. 
However, the opinion’s harshness comes into full focus when one 
considers that the opinion suggested that the majority of the Court 
may not believe that disparate impact is a key part of Title VII’s 
history. The Court appears to believe that disparate impact was not 
an original part of Title VII.132 The Court suggested that the 
language of Title VII originally only covered disparate treatment, 
with the Griggs Court simply adding disparate impact to Title VII 
on its own.133 Consequently, the language of the 1991 Act is the 
basis for disparate impact liability. Unfortunately, the Court may 
feel free to read the disparate impact cause of action codified in the 
1991 Act narrowly, as it appears to believe that the 1991 Act is the 
only textual support for the disparate impact cause of action.134 The 
Court’s thinly veiled contempt for disparate impact helped convince 
it that an employer’s concern about disparate impact is itself the near 
equivalent of disparate treatment, i.e., intentional discrimination 
against the group favored by the disparate impact. Unfortunately, the 
Court echoed its position in Lewis v. City of Chicago, a case 
addressing the claims of minority applicants for firefighting jobs in 
Chicago.135 The Court’s position is very worrisome if one believes 
that disparate impact discrimination must be actionable if Title VII 
is to eradicate barriers to workplace discrimination effectively. 
The Ricci Court’s hostility to Title VII disparate impact is ironic 
given that the Court imported a disparate impact claim into the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in Smith v. City of 
Jackson136 when it could have fairly easily denied the existence of 
an ADEA disparate impact cause of action.137 However, the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at 577 (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express 
prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact.”). See also 
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) (“As originally enacted, Title 
VII did not expressly prohibit employment practices that cause a disparate 
impact.”). 
 133. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577–78 (noting that Griggs “interpreted the Act to 
prohibit, in some cases, employers’ facially neutral practices that, in fact, are 
‘discriminatory in operation’”); see also Lewis, 560 U.S. at 211 (noting that 
Griggs interpreted Title VII to include disparate impact claims based on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2)). 
 134. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578 (“Twenty years after Griggs, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, was enacted. The Act included a provision codifying 
the prohibition on disparate-impact discrimination.”); see also Lewis, 560 U.S. at 
212 (“Two decades later, Congress codified the requirements of the ‘disparate 
impact’ claims Griggs had recognized.”). 
 135. Lewis, 560 U.S. 205. 
 136. 544 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2005). 
 137. Indeed, the Court had expressed doubts about the existence of an ADEA 
disparate impact claim in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
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position can be explained in two ways. First, the Court may have 
thought that disparate impact is a part of any discrimination scheme 
that does not strictly limit itself to intentional discrimination. 
Second, the nature and text of the ADEA may contemplate a 
disparate impact cause of action even if the language is not explicit. 
Of course, either of these explanations appears to fall flat given the 
Ricci Court’s suggestion that disparate impact was Court made until 
the 1991 Act codified disparate impact. 
However, the irony of a Court that seems solicitous of an ADEA 
disparate impact claim but hostile to a Title VII claim may fade 
away given how the Court has treated the ADEA claim.138 The Ricci 
Court recognized the existence of a Title VII disparate impact claim 
but narrowed it. Similarly, the Court noted the existence of an 
ADEA disparate impact claim but narrowed it. The Court created 
the ADEA claim in Smith but gave it a narrow reading.139 The Court 
then confirmed the claim in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power 
Laboratory but maintained its narrowness.140 Indeed, the Court has 
suggested that the ADEA disparate impact claim is narrower than 
the Title VII disparate impact claim.141  
The Court’s disparate impact doctrine is strange when viewed 
through the lens of employer prerogative. Disparate impact claims 
arose and became prominent through cases in which employers gave 
tests or installed rules that had a disparate impact but could not be 
validated as being particularly job related.142 Disparate impact 
doctrine rejected the employer’s right to use a test that yields a 
disparate impact, unless the test was validated as job related.143 Ricci 
appears to change that. After Ricci, an employer that gives a test is 
required to use the test results, even if the test yields a disparate 
impact, unless the employer can prove that the test is not job 
related.144 That restricts the employer’s prerogative to decline to use 
test results that yield a disparate impact. Oddly enough, an employer 
that gives a test and finds out that the test yields a disparate impact is 
not required to validate the test before using it. Rather, it may use 
the test results until someone challenges the validity of the test. 
Given the thrust of disparate impact—to limit the impact of facially 
                                                                                                             
 138. For a more detailed discussion of ADEA and Title VII disparate impact 
doctrine, see William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 
SMU L. REV. 81 (2009). 
 139. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–43. 
 140. 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008). 
 141. Id. at 98. 
 142. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 143. See, e.g., id; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435–36 (1971). 
 144. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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neutral rules that yield disproportionate harm to member of groups 
—this is surprising.  
Ricci both expanded employer prerogative and limited it. It 
allows employers to create whatever tests they want to create, if they 
do so in good faith. However, it restricts how the employer may use 
or decline to use the test results. The Ricci Court would likely argue 
that Title VII requires that limitation because New Haven wanted to 
decline to use the test results for a discriminatory reason. However, 
the issue is more complex than that because New Haven wanted a 
diverse group of commanders in its fire department. Certainly, it 
also wanted to test for the best people to fill those spots. However, 
when the City realized that following the test results would not 
create a diverse command and that there were other testing 
procedures that might help it create a diverse command, the city 
used its prerogative to decline to use test results that it believed to 
reflect talent inadequately.145 The Court rejected that use of 
prerogative.146 
Whether the Court is intentionally seeking to limit the effect of 
disparate impact or does not realize the implications of its decisions 
is unclear. However, if the trend continues with the Court treating 
cognizance of race or other characteristics as almost equal to 
disparate treatment, there could be significant problems for Title 
VII. Disparate impact has been a key part of Title VII since 1971 
and acts to limit employer prerogative by making clear that rules 
that are not triggered by intentional discrimination may yet be 
unlawful. Narrowing that understanding is one more problem for 
Title VII’s quest to eliminate all workplace barriers to equality. 
C. Retaliation 
Protection against retaliation is a key part of Title VII. Without 
that protection, challenging employment discrimination would be 
nearly impossible. Indeed, the Court has inserted retaliation claims 
in other statutes where they did not explicitly exist because 
protection against retaliation was deemed necessary to protect the 
underlying right that was explicitly protected in the statute.147 
Without retaliation protection, employees would have a difficult 
time protecting their own employment, and very few would engage 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 574. 
 146. See id. at 593. 
 147. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (finding 
retaliation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); Jackson v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (finding retaliation cognizable under Title IX 
private cause of action). 
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in actions that might protect the employment rights of others. 
Indeed, some argue that protection against retaliation is a necessary 
part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.148 
The Court has treated Title VII retaliation claims somewhat 
similarly to how it has handled Title VII disparate impact claims. 
Both retaliation and disparate impact claims are explicitly 
recognized in Title VII, so the Court recognizes them.149 Similarly, 
the Court has been somewhat solicitous of retaliation claims outside 
of Title VII, as it has with disparate impact claims outside of Title 
VII. Indeed, the Court has been reasonably supportive of Title VII 
retaliation claims, even supporting wider coverage for Title VII 
retaliation than some appellate courts initially provided.150 However, 
as with disparate impact claims, the Court has narrowed the 
retaliation cause of action with procedural roadblocks and 
substantive doctrines that will make recovery under retaliation less 
likely than it arguably should be. 
Title VII bars discriminating against an individual who has 
formally or informally participated in challenging an employment 
practice that the individual reasonably believes is an unlawful 
employment practice.151 The retaliation cause of action that stems 
from the prohibition is simple. It requires that the plaintiff prove that 
he or she engaged in protected activity and that the employer 
discriminated against the plaintiff because of that protected 
activity.152 Of course, the Court has interpreted elements of the 
                                                                                                             
 148. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as 
a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 863 (2008) (“A successful rights-
claiming system must respond to employees’ needs at both ends of the rights-
claiming process, enabling and encouraging employees whose rights are violated 
to come forward and protecting them from possible retaliation when they do.”). 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k), 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 150. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 
555 U.S. 271, 273 (2009) (broadening retaliation protection in holding retaliation 
“protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on 
her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal 
investigation”). 
 151. See § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.”). 
 152. See Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“The [retaliation] prima facie case consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff 
engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s exercise of her 
protected rights was known to defendant; (3) an adverse employment action was 
subsequently taken against the employee or the employee was subjected to severe 
or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal 
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cause of action, including what constitutes causation and what 
behavior qualifies as discrimination. Each interpretive step provides 
the Court with an opportunity to narrow the retaliation cause of 
action. 
The causation standard that the Court applied in University of 
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar narrowed the 
retaliation cause of action.153 In Nassar, the Court ruled that the but-
for causation standard that applies in ADEA non-retaliation cases 
should apply in Title VII retaliation cases.154 The decision is 
important, in part, because proving that retaliation is the but-for 
cause of an employment action is the most difficult form of 
causation to prove. However, how and why the Court decided to 
apply an ADEA standard to a Title VII retaliation case is just as 
important. The Court’s approach suggests a reluctance to expand 
Title VII coverage. 
The Nassar Court considered the main issue that it resolved to 
be a causation issue.155 However, it could have considered the issue 
to be an evidentiary or substantive issue related to defining the 
substance of the retaliation claim. At base, the Nassar Court had 
three options for deciding the causation issue. It could have decided 
that the but-for causation standard—a standard that arguably had not 
applied to Title VII causes of action since before Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins was decided in 1989—should apply to Title VII 
retaliation cases.156 It could have decided that the Price Waterhouse 
mixed-motives structure—the causation standard in place before the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991—should apply to Title VII retaliation 
claims. Lastly, it could have decided that the motiving factor test—
in place for Title VII claims other than retaliation under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991—should define the substance of Title VII 
retaliation claims.157 The motivating factor test defines the substance 
of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII and subsumes a 
causation standard that is more relaxed than but-for causation. The 
Nassar Court chose the first path. 
                                                                                                             
 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or 
harassment.”); Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011) (“To 
succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she engaged in a 
protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against her, and (3) there was 
a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse 
action.”). 
 153. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 154. Id. at 2534. 
 155. Id. at 2522. 
 156. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
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Title VII does not specify a causation standard. It merely 
requires that the plaintiff be harmed because of the employee’s race, 
color, sex, religion, or national origin in status-based cases or 
because the employee engaged in protected activity in retaliation 
cases.158 The causation standard that the Court chose—but-for 
causation—is a common tort causation standard. It requires that a 
fact finder determine that but for the action taken by the defendant, 
the relevant harm would not have occurred.159 In the context of a 
standard Title VII case, but-for causation requires that a plaintiff 
prove that but for the defendant’s discriminatory animus, the 
plaintiff would not have suffered harm. That can be difficult to 
prove when the employer claims that a legitimate reason explains 
the adverse job action at issue and the employer has sole access to 
the reasons an adverse job action was taken. Nonetheless, the but-for 
standard arguably applied to Title VII cases decided before Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.160  
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court decided that but-for 
causation was not the appropriate causation standard in all situations 
and causation might be satisfied by something less than proof of 
but-for causation in some situations.161 In that case, at issue was 
whether the plaintiff was the subject of sex discrimination when the 
defendant considered her for partnership.162 Evidence had been 
presented that partners had engaged in sex stereotyping and 
provided sex-influenced evaluations during the process.163 However, 
evidence had also been presented that there were legitimate reasons 
for the plaintiff to have been denied partnership.164 The Court 
determined that when evidence was presented that could directly 
support the contention that sex had been considered when an 
employment decision was made, shifting the burden of proof to the 
employer to prove that it would have made the same decision had it 
not considered the employee’s sex was sensible.165 This is a mixed-
                                                                                                             
 158. See id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). 
 159. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525. 
 160. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
 161. The various justices who wrote opinions in Price Waterhouse advocated 
for four different causation standards. For a discussion of Price Waterhouse, see 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2004). 
 162. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32. 
 163. Id. at 234–35. See also Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of 
Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 45–46 (2009) (discussing evidence presented in 
Price Waterhouse and social framework theory). 
 164. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234. 
 165. Id. at 258 (“We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that 
her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may 
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motives standard of proof.166 The focus in a mixed-motives case is 
whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to switch the 
burden of proof to the employer. This standard appeared short-lived. 
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
upended the notion of mixed motives as a proof issue when it 
inserted the motivating factor test into Title VII.167 
The motivating factor test deems the use of an illegitimate 
factor, such as sex, as a motivating factor in employment decision-
making to be an unlawful employment practice.168 The motivating 
factor test is not strictly a causation test; it is a substantive rule. It 
defines when an unlawful employment practice has occurred and 
creates liability at the moment sex or another illegitimate factor 
motivates an adverse employment decision, whether or not the 
illegitimate factor is a but-for cause of the employment decision.169 
The 1991 Act states that there will be no recovery for substantive 
harm if the employer can prove that it would have taken the same 
employment action without the unlawful consideration of the 
illegitimate factor, i.e., if it can prove that the illegitimate factor was 
not a but-for cause of the adverse employment action.170 In that 
circumstance, the plaintiff may only receive injunctive or 
declaratory relief and may only recover costs and fees.171 The 
motivating factor test codifies that Title VII is violated when 
discrimination plays a role in a process, not solely when 
discrimination is a but-for cause of harm to the employee’s 
employment. However, the rule is thought to be a causation test 
because it displaces the but-for rule—a clear causation test.  
Given the development of causation doctrine under Title VII, the 
Nassar Court could have followed the reasoning that prior Courts 
had used and concluded that the motivating factor test should apply 
to Title VII retaliation claims. Instead, it decided to rethink 
causation and installed the but-for causation standard into the Title 
VII retaliation cause of action. The Court’s choice to decline to 
                                                                                                             
 
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's 
gender into account.”) (plurality opinion). 
 166. Id. at 232 (“We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts 
of Appeals concerning the respective burdens of proof of a defendant and plaintiff 
in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an employment decision 
resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.”). 
 167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). 
2014] THE SUPREME COURT AND TITLE VII 1185 
 
 
 
apply the motivating factor test to the retaliation cause of action was 
not shocking.172 The Court had rethought causation in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc.173 Consequently, though Gross was an 
ADEA case, the Court’s attempt to rethink causation in a Title VII 
retaliation case is not startling.174 However, the reason that the Court 
decided to ignore both the motivating factor test and the Price 
Waterhouse structure to settle on but-for causation for Title VII 
retaliation claims is very surprising. 
The Court rejected the motivating factor test for the retaliation 
claim and found that the motivating factor test is embedded in a 
section of Title VII that only applies to status-based discrimination 
claims.175 Given that, the Court found that the motivating factor test 
could not apply to the retaliation claim.176 To some, the reasoning is 
not convincing, but it could be theoretically sound if one takes a 
pure clause-based vision of causation. 
The Nassar Court’s reasoning for bypassing the Price 
Waterhouse structure is more troubling. The Court treated the 
causation issue as though it were a matter of first impression.177 The 
Court might argue that causation under the Title VII retaliation 
claim was a matter of first impression for the Supreme Court. 
However, that is not convincing. Causation is about how to interpret 
the term “because of.” That term applies to both the retaliation claim 
and the status-based claim. Unless the term is supposed to mean 
something different in one part of the statute than it means in 
another part of the statute, the Court should not have acted as though 
it was writing on a blank slate. 
The Court resolved the issue by arguing that the Price 
Waterhouse structure had been completely removed from Title VII 
doctrine by the 1991 Act.178 The Court appeared to suggest that the 
1991 Act removed Price Waterhouse from the entirety of Title VII 
because the 1991 Act codified a test that was different from the 
                                                                                                             
 172. There are reasons why the Court might not apply the motivating factor 
test. For a discussion of the topic in depth, see Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of 
“Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying 
Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor 
Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But Should), 64 
ALA. L. REV. 1067 (2013) (discussing how Title VII retaliation claims should be 
analyzed).  
 173. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 174. See Chambers, supra note 3, at 592 (noting the Court’s willingness to 
rethink basic employment discrimination doctrine). 
 175. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–29 
(2013). 
 176. Id. at 2534. 
 177. Id. at 2526–27. 
 178. See id. at 2534. 
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Price Waterhouse structure. That suggestion might seem reasonable 
had the 1991 Act altered Price Waterhouse because Congress 
wanted a causation standard that better resembled but-for causation. 
However, the motivating factor test provides a standard that is more 
relaxed regarding causation than the Price Waterhouse standard.179 
Consequently, the Court appears to argue that Congress intended to, 
or simply did, install the motivating factor test so that it would only 
apply to status-based claims and destroyed the more relaxed Price 
Waterhouse standard for retaliation claims so that those claims 
would be governed by a stricter but-for causation standard. The 
Supreme Court may intend for that to be the case, but it is unlikely 
that Congress intended for that to be the effect of the 1991 Act. 
Once the Court determined that the motivating factor test and 
Price Waterhouse were not necessarily applicable to the Title VII 
retaliation claim, the Court could rethink causation. Once the Court 
rethought causation freely, it could adopt recent cases that had 
considered causation issues. In Gross, the Court considered 
causation in the context of the ADEA status-based cause of action 
and determined that but-for causation applied.180 The Nassar Court 
borrowed the reasoning from Gross and installed but-for causation 
as its interpretation of what “because of” means for Title VII 
retaliation cases.181 That was the Court’s path to narrow Title VII 
retaliation claims. 
Even though the Court acknowledged—as it had to—that the 
retaliation claim is a legitimate cause of action, it narrowed the 
cause of action when it logically could have made it broader. In 
deciding Nassar, the Supreme Court seemed willing to go only as 
far as Title VII explicitly allowed and showed no deference to prior 
Courts that had thought about the causation issue. That willingness 
to rethink a basic aspect of Title VII is troublesome, given the 
Court’s apparent hostility to parts of Title VII. 
Even in Title VII retaliation cases where the Court appears to 
expand Title VII coverage, it tends to provide an avenue to limit the 
eventual coverage. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 
the Court broadened the coverage of Title VII’s retaliation provision 
by allowing third-party retaliation claims.182 In that case, the 
employer supposedly retaliated against the plaintiff’s fiancé, who 
had filed a sex discrimination charge against the employer, by firing 
                                                                                                             
 179. See id. (noting that the but-for standard is more demanding than the 
motivating factor standard). 
 180. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 181. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527–28. 
 182. 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011). 
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the plaintiff.183 The Court ruled that the plaintiff could sue under 
Title VII.184 This arguably expanded Title VII retaliation protection. 
Title VII bars retaliation when an employee has formally or 
informally challenged employer behavior that the employee 
reasonably believed is an unlawful employment practice.185 The 
plaintiff’s fiancé had engaged in behavior that would trigger 
retaliation protection for her, but the plaintiff had not.186 
Consequently, the bar on retaliation arguably did not protect him. 
However, the Court found that the plaintiff was an aggrieved person 
under Title VII who could recover for any unlawful employment 
practice that harmed him.187 The retaliation against the plaintiff’s 
fiancé—the plaintiff’s termination—was an unlawful employment 
practice that harmed the plaintiff.188  
The Thompson Court’s decision on third-party retaliation 
expands Title VII coverage. However, the Court noted that 
actionable retaliation exists only when a reasonable employee would 
be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity.189 That left the 
scope of liability for retaliation open. The Court noted that the firing 
of a close family member would almost always reasonably dissuade 
an employee but noted that the infliction of “a milder reprisal on a 
mere acquaintance will almost never do so.”190 To be clear, the 
question is not whether the mild reprisal or the firing was retaliatory. 
The question is whether the clear retaliation against a mere 
acquaintance would have dissuaded the employee from engaging in 
the protected activity. That is not the obvious import of the text of 
Title VII’s retaliation provision. Rather, it is the result of the Court’s 
dissuasion standard that stemmed from its interpretation of the 
retaliation provision.191  
Additional doctrines narrow the retaliation provision.192 For 
example, the Court’s temporal proximity doctrine requires that the 
employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse 
employment action be fairly close in time, though the retaliation 
clause has no such requirement.193 Similarly, the Court allows 
                                                                                                             
 183. Id. at 867. 
 184. Id. at 870. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 186. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867. 
 187. Id. at 870. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 868.  
 190. Id.  
 191. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 192. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 148, at 864 (suggesting that Title VII 
lacks sufficient practical protection from retaliation). 
 193. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) 
(discussing temporal proximity). For an in-depth discussion of temporal proximity 
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plaintiffs who reasonably believe that they are challenging an 
unlawful employment practice to sue an employer.194 However, it is 
unclear how much that doctrine protects plaintiffs.195 The Court and 
other federal courts do not appear hostile to retaliation cases.196 
However, the roadblocks that they are placing in front of retaliation 
plaintiffs are no less effective than if they were motivated by 
hostility. For those who believe that protection against retaliation is 
absolutely necessary to a functioning Title VII, this is very 
problematic. 
D. Procedural Issues 
There are procedural issues, some specific to Title VII and 
others not specific to Title VII, that may narrow the opportunity for 
Title VII plaintiffs to recover. The Court has tightened pleading 
standards. Courts continue to encourage summary judgment. Class 
actions may not be as available as they have been in the past. If the 
Court continues to encourage such limitations, the possibility that 
Title VII will continue to live up to its potential becomes less 
likely.197 
                                                                                                             
 
in Title VII cases, see Troy B. Daniels & Richard A. Bales, Plus at Pretext: 
Resolving the Split Regarding the Sufficiency of Temporal Proximity Evidence in 
Title VII Retaliation Cases, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 493 (2008). 
 194. See, e.g., Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 
716 F.3d 10, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, 
LLC., 736 F.3d 396, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing reasonable belief). 
 195. For an in-depth discussion of the value of the reasonable belief doctrine, 
see Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 375 (2010). 
 196. Indeed, the Court has been generous to retaliation claims in situations 
where it need not have been. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011) (ruling that oral complaint satisfied 
requirement that plaintiff have “filed any complaint” under Fair Labor Standards 
Act). 
 197. An additional issue that relates to Title VII is the Court’s approval of 
forced internal dispute resolution. It may be helpful to employer, but it can create 
an additional barrier to Title VII recovery. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 
148, at 864 (“The increasing privatization of employment disputes—a recent trend 
noted by many scholars—adds to the severity and nature of the problems we 
identify. By channeling bias claims into internal dispute resolution processes, in 
lieu of or as a prerequisite to the pursuit of formal statutory remedies, employers 
have effectively added another layer of obstacles to the enforcement of 
employees’ statutory rights.”). Compulsory arbitration of claims has been a 
controversial issue for years. See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of 
Employment Discrimination Claims With Special Reference to the Three A’s—
Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231 (1996). 
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The Court has tightened pleading standards. Rather than allow 
pure notice pleading as in the past, the Court is now requiring 
plausible pleading.198 Though the Court has yet to explicitly limit 
Title VII pleadings, that day may be coming.199 Some might argue 
that a plaintiff who cannot meet a pleading standard has little chance 
to win. However, that may not be true. More importantly, the 
tightening of pleading standards may have the effect of requiring 
that Title VII plaintiffs be ready to litigate earlier in the process. 
Though that may sound appropriate, it may make Title VII litigation 
more costly for plaintiffs, and cases may be less likely to be brought. 
Unless costliness is a good proxy for the quality of a case, increasing 
the cost to litigate is not likely to increase the quality of the cases 
that are brought. If good Title VII cases are not brought, Title VII is 
less likely to serve its purposes. 
Moreover, federal judges like summary judgment,200 and even 
more so in employment discrimination cases than in other types of 
cases.201 Whether this is because judges dislike employment 
discrimination cases more than other cases or whether employment 
discrimination cases are weaker than other cases is not clear.202 
However, the incidence of summary judgment is not in question.203 
At issue is whether summary judgment is stopping meritorious cases 
from being heard. If so, Title VII has very little chance to work as 
fully as it should. Given that the Supreme Court has shown no 
appetite for lessening the incidence of summary judgment, Title VII 
plaintiffs may have to bring higher-quality cases than other litigants 
to survive summary judgment. That may not have much effect on 
                                                                                                             
 198. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 
550 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 199. See Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2011) (“Several scholars have warned that 
plausible pleading poses a particular threat to plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases.”). 
 200. See Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments 
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33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469 (2009). 
 201. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From The “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ 
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judgment. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication 
Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103 (2005). 
 203. See Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination 
Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 672 (2012−2013) 
(noting that summary judgment is granted more often in employment cases than in 
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actual judgments, depending on how high the bar for summary 
judgment should be.204  
In addition, the Court continues to remake its class action 
doctrine. A serious discussion of that issue would take a substantial 
amount of space. However, a quick word about Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes is necessary.205 In that case, the Court declined to 
certify a huge class of about 1.5 million women who were 
employees or former employees of Wal-Mart.206 The class 
challenged how Wal-Mart promoted and paid its female workers.207 
The plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart gave substantial discretion to 
managers to use their judgment to make pay and promotion 
decisions and that the discretion yielded discriminatory decisions.208 
When combined with Wal-Mart’s culture that may have been 
particularly susceptible to bias, the plaintiffs claimed that class 
certification was appropriate because the class members’ claims met 
the commonality requirement.209 The Court decided otherwise and 
decertified the class.210  
The issue in Wal-Mart is not whether the case was wrongly 
decided but how the Court discussed the intersection of 
commonality and Title VII. The Court suggested that commonality 
was best understood as every class member having the same claim 
and the same style of recovery.211 Though the Court loosened the 
standard to include situations in which all class members are subject 
to employer-wide bias, the Court noted that evidence that was 
deemed sufficient for class certification at the district court was not 
close to being sufficient to support class certification.212 The district 
court may have been wrong about the evidence; however, it may be 
that the Wal-Mart Court is suggesting that the kind of evidence that 
has been sufficient to support class certification is no longer 
sufficient for the task.213 That would be a change that may harm 
                                                                                                             
 204. See Chambers, supra note 202, at 131–32. 
 205. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 206. Id. at 2561. 
 207. Id. at 2547. 
 208. See id. at 2554. Of course, the Wal-Mart Court recognized that subjective 
procedures could be subject to disparate impact analysis and class recovery. Id. 
(citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)). Nonetheless, 
the Court declined class certification in this case. Id. at 2561. 
 209. See id. at 2553. 
 210. See id. at 2561. 
 211. See id. at 2550–51. 
 212. Id. at 2554 (noting that proof was “worlds away from” what was 
necessary to support certification). 
 213. The Court rejected evidence regarding social framework theory, although 
it may have been doing more than that. See Hart & Secunda, supra note 163, at 67 
(“The debate over admissibility of social framework testimony is one of a set of 
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Title VII’s ability to maximize its effectiveness through class 
actions.214  
III. NEXT STEPS FOR TITLE VII? 
The Supreme Court’s approach to Title VII appears to be at odds 
with Title VII’s original vision. Title VII provides broad protections 
against inappropriate decision-making and unjust decisions made by 
employers. Historically, Title VII has been read to expand 
opportunities for minority groups. The expansion has often stemmed 
from the recognition that Title VII could always be applied in a 
more just fashion.215 Simply, Title VII doctrine followed Title VII’s 
ideals. 
However, some of the Supreme Court’s recent cases have 
suggested that the Court will focus its interpretation of Title VII on 
its vision of the meaning of Title VII’s text, even if that is 
inconsistent with Title VII’s overall vision or the vision that 
Congress apparently had when it passed Title VII and its various 
amendments. Of course, the Court’s vision is not completely at odds 
with prior doctrine. The Supreme Court may be hostile to some 
aspects of Title VII, but its recent decisions do not suggest that the 
Court plans to erase Title VII from the statute books. Indeed, the 
Court is not necessarily openly hostile to Title VII and equality. 
Rather, it has a particular vision of Title VII. The Court’s 
interpretations may whittle Title VII coverage. 
The Court is rethinking Title VII doctrines. It is justifying or 
declining to justify those doctrines in ways that are foreign to 
traditional Title VII thinking. The Court’s position on disparate 
impact and how it relates to disparate treatment is instructive. The 
Court has taken disparate impact—a doctrine that has been treated 
as an extension of or companion to disparate treatment—and put it 
into serious tension with disparate treatment. It has equated the 
desire to avoid disparate impact with disparate treatment. If that line 
of thinking stands, harmonizing the two styles of discrimination may 
become difficult.  
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Similarly, the Court is rethinking causation issues. The Court’s 
decision to reach back past Price Waterhouse to apply but-for 
causation to a Title VII retaliation claim required the Court to reject 
its own Title VII doctrine to reach a strange result that some thought 
had been buried by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.216 Given how 
important the causation standard is when litigating discrimination 
claims that can be difficult to prove, the Court’s position is fraught 
with peril for Title VII plaintiffs. As important, the Court’s 
willingness to ignore or willfully misunderstand Congress’s 
suggestion, based on its adoption of the motivating factor test in the 
1991 Act, that Title VII is violated when improper motives affect 
the decision-making process—not only when harm is actually 
visited upon the employee—is troubling. The Court’s approach 
suggests a willingness to reinterpret any doctrine that has not been 
explicitly stated in Title VII.217 Given this Court’s generally 
skeptical outlook on Title VII, that does not bode well for Title VII’s 
expansion to limits that will allow Title VII to serve its original 
function of promoting full equality in the workplace. 
Even when the Court does not rethink fundamental doctrine, it 
demonstrates a willingness to narrow Title VII. It is not so much that 
specific cases are being decided incorrectly—though some are 
arguably being decided incorrectly—it is that the Court’s overall 
trend leads away from a robustly enforced Title VII. For example, 
its approach to retaliation is to be generally solicitous of the cause of 
action.218 However, the Court narrowed retaliation in a way that 
may not provide nearly as much protection for the employee as Title 
VII might suggest. Logically, the result of narrowing the retaliation 
claim will be to discourage employees from challenging unlawful 
employment practices. Given that the retaliation clause exists to 
support and encourage employees to challenge unlawful 
employment practices, the narrowing of the retaliation claim is not 
just problematic for the employee; it is problematic for Title VII and 
the workplace. 
                                                                                                             
 216. See supra Part II.C. 
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However, the Court’s most important move may have been to 
provide additional latitude to employers to structure the workplace 
and avoid Title VII liability.219 Given that employers shape the 
workplace and its rules, providing additional latitude to the 
employer is likely to make the workplace less just. Usually, an 
employer can make the workplace more just, if it wants, without 
encouragement from Title VII. Indeed, Title VII tends to stop 
employers from making the workplace less just.  Consequently, little 
reason exists to believe that more employer latitude will benefit 
employees or necessarily make the workplace more just. 
If the current trend continues, Title VII may be whittled down to 
its core provisions. Disparate treatment claims, including sexual 
harassment claims, will not go away. However, they may become 
harder to win. Disparate impact claims will exist but in weakened 
form. Disparate impact might only cover clear rules that are 
obviously not job related and cause a substantial disparate impact. A 
relatively weak retaliation claim that may not embolden employees 
to challenge unlawful employment practices may remain. That core 
of claims would provide some protection to employees but nothing 
like what is necessary for Title VII to meet its potential and its 
promise. Unless something changes, this may be Title VII’s brave 
new world. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a core of Title VII that the Supreme Court cannot and 
would not dare kill. However, the Court is chipping away at Title 
VII. That chipping away is narrowing Title VII’s potential effect. 
Unless Congress is ready to defend and amend Title VII when 
necessary and make sure that future Supreme Court justices are 
going to protect Title VII in a way that the justices have not in the 
past few decades, Title VII’s relevance will diminish and workplace 
justice will become more difficult to find. 
The Court would argue that it is not chipping away at Title VII 
or moving it in any particular direction. Rather, the Court would 
argue that it is merely deciding the cases that come before it 
consistent with Title VII’s text and prior precedent. That is the 
standard vision of what a court does, but it is not a complete picture. 
As the Supreme Court interprets Title VII, it can always choose 
from multiple paths. When choosing a path, the Court can choose a 
path that is consistent with Title VII’s purpose and history, or it can 
choose a path that may not be consistent with that purpose and 
history. The Court has done the latter with respect to a number of 
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cases over the past several years. Those actions have eroded Title 
VII somewhat. If the Court continues, the erosion will continue.  
Title VII is more than just a collection of words. It reflects an 
idea. It was drafted and passed with a purpose. Choices that the 
Supreme Court makes that appear inconsistent with the statute’s 
purpose do not reflect Title VII’s text; they reflect the Court’s 
mindset. To ensure that Title VII functions as it should, the Court 
ought to change its mindset, with help if necessary. 
